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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article sets out an informal political economic theory which
explains the relative permanence of regulatory carrots—legislative
subsidies and mandates for product use—versus the transience of reg-
ulatory sticks—traditional costly regulatory requirements. After set-
ting out the elements of this theory, I illustrate it with the dramatic
rise in the Obama Administration and abrupt cessation in the Trump
Administration of attempts to use conventional U.S. environmental
regulatory sticks to end the U.S. coal industry. The Article turns then
to describe a concrete example of a regulatory carrot—the U.S. corn
ethanol mandate—that has survived despite overwhelming evidence
that its environmental benefits, if any, are far outweighed by its envi-
ronmental and economic costs.
This Article concludes by discussing subsidies for solar energy.
These subsidies, found throughout the world, continue despite grow-
ing economic evidence that the economic benefits from solar power—
particularly the profits that accrue from making solar photovoltaic
(“PV”) panels—will be highly concentrated geographically, with few
countries sharing in the economic rents from solar power mandates.
There is evidence that this concentration will not result because par-
ticular counties’ regulatory carrots are more generous and effective,
but because production of renewable energy products and services
such as crystalline silicon solar PV cells and modules are capital inten-
sive with pronounced economies of scale. When this is true, interna-
tional competition in such nationally subsidized, capital intensive
renewable energy industries may interact with government-deter-
mined demand for renewable energy products in a way that turns the
ordinary rules of supply and demand on their head. Lower costs and
prices may lead to a contraction or inward shift in subsidized demand,
so that the demand expansion necessary for competitive market con-
ditions may not be realized. At the same time, the environmental ben-
efits from solar power are, at least so far, small at best. Thus for most
countries, solar power has generated higher electricity prices with few
environmental or economic benefits. And yet—as further evidence for
my positive theory of the persistence of carrots—in the United States,
solar subsidies were not only retained but, in the case of solar PV
panels, actually strengthened by the imposition of import tariffs.
II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
STICKS AND CARROTS
In the climate change arena and perhaps more generally, legislative
carrots are statutory programs that subsidize or mandate the use of a
particular product or service. As discussed further below, the federal
Renewable Fuel Standard (“RFS”), which originated in the 2005 En-
ergy Policy Act, mandates that billions of gallons of renewable fuel be
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blended into gasoline. While that law is a stick of sorts, in that it man-
dates that gasoline refiners and blenders meet a renewable blend
quota, it has massively stimulated demand for corn, the primary etha-
nol feedstock. It has thereby provided a carrot in the form of a de-
mand subsidy for corn growers, landowners, and ethanol refiners.
Another carrot, also discussed below, comes in the form of legislation
mandating that electricity suppliers purchase a minimum amount of
electric power from solar- or wind-powered generating facilities.
By regulatory sticks, I mean regulations that impose costly compli-
ance requirements on firms.1 By imposing emission reduction require-
ments, virtually all traditional federal environmental statutes enable
agencies such as the federal Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) to impose regulatory sticks. Those traditional statutes, how-
ever, generally consist of vague commands to a regulatory agency to
regulate to achieve a “safe” level of risk, or to lower emissions of
some type if it “finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary.”2
Such vague statutes give discretion to the EPA to impose costly regu-
latory requirements, but they also retain a continuing opportunity for
members of Congress to intervene to lobby that agency to lessen regu-
latory costs to politically important industries.3
From the point of view of political economics, the key difference
between federal legislative carrots and federal regulatory sticks is that
legislative carrots confer concentrated benefits with diffuse costs while
regulatory sticks impose concentrated costs with diffuse benefits. In
addition to this core political-economic difference, there is a crucial
institutional distinction. Legislation is the product of majority voting
in Congress. Costly regulation is the product of executive branch
agency interpretation and implementation of statutes that Congress
passed. As I now explain, for both political-economic and institutional
reasons, it is much more likely that inefficient regulatory sticks can be
removed than that similarly inefficient legislative carrots will be
ended.
A. Legislative Carrots
Consider carrots first. Once in existence, legislative carrots generate
economic rents that create present day capitalized gains, which drive
up the stakes for beneficiaries, thus rationally motivating them to in-
1. Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for
Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343, 1363–64 (2002).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (instructing the EPA to regulate hazardous air pol-
lutants from fossil fuel powered electricity generating plants if it “finds . . . regulation
is appropriate and necessary after considering the results of a study” of “the hazards
to public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by [power
plants] of [hazardous air pollutants]”); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015)
(holding that in determining whether a regulation is “appropriate,” the EPA must
consider the costs of compliance).
3. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 1399–1400.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL107.txt unknown Seq: 4  6-DEC-18 14:47
110 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
vest very large amounts to make sure that they keep the carrots.4 To
see the value of a legislative carrot, consider one that takes the form
of a $1 per year increase in the net profit of producers of a particular
product. This profit increase can be thought of as arising from a direct
increase in demand, such as the increase in demand for corn or renew-
able electricity generated by the ethanol mandate and renewable en-
ergy subsidies discussed at greater length below. With an interest rate
given by r, the present value of the $1 carrot is given by $1/r.5 Thus
with an interest rate, for example, of .04, the creation of an ethanol
subsidy increasing net profits per acre of corn by $1 per year would
increase the present value of that acre by $25.
Given this multiplier effect, once the carrot is factored into the mar-
ket prices of capital assets such as land, buyers of such capital assets
have a great deal to lose from elimination of the legislative subsidy. In
the above example, if the $1 subsidy was equal to a 50% increase in
net profits, then loss of that subsidy would mean a catastrophic 50%
decrease in the value of the land. Legislative carrots thus create both
high stakes in legislative conflicts over their retention and the wealth
that makes beneficiaries effective advocates for their interests.
Legislative carrots are, almost by definition, targeted at particular
industries and activities. Such industries, such as the ethanol and solar
power industries discussed below in more detail, are quite literally
creatures of legislation. While they may differ in some respects, all
firms within such an industry have a shared interest in retaining the
legislative carrots that have created the industry.
Opponents of inefficient legislative carrots thus face concentrated
beneficiaries whose stakes in and resources available for a contest to
remove them reflect the capitalized value of the carrots. The natural
opponents of carrots are people who bear the costs of the activities
incentivized by carrots—such as higher food prices due to the ethanol
mandate discussed in detail below. Often, however, such costs are
large in the aggregate but diffused over millions of individuals, such as
consumers of higher priced food. A foundational insight of public
choice theory is that given such small individual stakes, it may be eco-
nomically irrational for individuals who bear the costs of even grossly
inefficient legislative carrots to lobby Congress for their repeal.6
As the history of the environmental movement shows, however,
non-profit organizations can and do form to represent the aggregate
stakes and interests of diffuse losers from legislative carrots. Yet even
4. Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT
SEEKING SOCIETY 97–112 (James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison & Gordon Tul-
lock, eds., 1980) (providing the basic insight that the benefits of legislation set the
stakes in conflict games to get and retain such benefits).
5. That is, the present value of the $1 per year increase in net profits is given by
= $1/r.
6. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
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if such groups have formed, they face very large transaction costs in
seeking to eliminate legislative carrots. The courts are largely closed
to them. Under Article I (Section 8, Clause 1) of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, Congress has the power to “levy taxes to provide for the com-
mon defense and general welfare of the United States.” With really
only one exception—where Congress attaches conditions to a state’s
receipt of federal funds—the Supreme Court has been clear that the
courts are not in the business of interpreting “general welfare” to im-
pose limits on Congress’s exercise of the spending power.7
It is true that some exercises of the congressional spending power
may ultimately open the courts to opponents of the spending. The Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (“NEPA”) was passed to em-
power citizen litigants (meaning environmental groups) to bring
lawsuits requiring federal agencies to assess the environmental im-
pacts of its projects before proceeding with them. Inasmuch as such
projects do represent congressional spending, NEPA gives a right to
challenge the process by which that power is ultimately exercised. As
Richard Esptein argues elsewhere in this volume, NEPA’s procedural
requirements can impose such significant costs that not only federal
projects, but primarily private projects, are ultimately killed.
Even NEPA challenges are limited, however, by the constitutional
requirement that a plaintiff have standing to sue (meaning for envi-
ronmental groups that some individual members have standing).8
Standing doctrine may be viewed in large part as designed to keep
political disputes about the exercise of the spending power out of the
courts. Thus, for those who suffer the costs of legislative spending—
carrots—the remedy is to lobby Congress for repeal.
Lobbying Congress for repeal of a legislative carrot that has already
been capitalized into privately held assets is, to say the least, a Hercu-
lean undertaking. Those who seek repeal of the legislative carrot must
approach a very large number of congressional members whose con-
stituents do not get concentrated benefits from the carrot, but rather
bear diffuse costs. To be sure, they can offer such representatives an
opportunity to go on record as opposing federal-legislative programs
that generate only costs to their constituents. This may seem like an
attractive policy position. But taking such a position may be disastrous
7. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 213 (1987) (setting out a four-part test
that limits the kinds of conditions that Congress can impose on state receipt of federal
funds).
8. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009) (holding that five con-
servation groups lacked standing to challenge U.S. Forest Service (“USFS”) regula-
tions that exempt small timber sales from the notice, comment, and appeal process
generally required under the National Forest Management Act, reaffirming the rule
that a plaintiff has standing only to sue for concrete and particularized individual
injury and not for a generalized policy disagreement, and clarified also that even when
the plaintiff is just alleging that statutory procedures have not been followed, the
plaintiff must show harm to a “concrete interest”).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL107.txt unknown Seq: 6  6-DEC-18 14:47
112 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
to a member, for it may well disturb the implicit terms of a congres-
sional deal. In order to get votes in favor of legislation that generated
concentrated benefits for home district or state constituents, members
may have engaged in log-rolling deals under which they voted for
other legislative programs that imposed diffuse costs on their home
constituents but brought concentrated benefits to other members’
states or districts. To be more concrete, were a non-corn state member
to reverse course and support repeal of the ethanol mandate, she
would risk losing the votes of members of the ethanol coalition for
legislation that brings concentrated benefits to her own state or
district.
There is rigorous econometric evidence that such log-rolling deals
affect congressional voting.9 Asking a member of Congress to vote for
repeal of a legislative carrot that they have supported in exchange for
other members’ votes in favor of their own home-benefiting carrot is
asking a legislator to renege on a deal. Such behavior risks future re-
taliation by other members. Given the miniscule individual cost to tax-
payers who bear the cost of even a grossly inefficient legislative carrot,
it is unlikely that a campaign ad trumpeting how a member voted to
kill such an inefficient carrot can compensate for the potential loss of
votes for similarly inefficient programs that confer concentrated bene-
fits on her own constituents.
B. Regulatory Sticks
A regulatory program that threatens future compliance costs cre-
ates an incentive for actors potentially subject to such regulation to
incur present day costs to prevent such regulation. However, unlike
legislative carrots, regulatory sticks generate an immediate decrease in
the value of firms subject to regulation. While for future or potential
regulation this value decrease reflects only the (discounted) expected
future regulatory cost, whether already imposed or merely threatened,
costly regulatory sticks lower the capital value of regulatory targets by
making them riskier. On the margin, this decrease in value reduces the
resources available to contest regulation. Indeed, in the case of
targeted industries, costly regulation can lead to the successive bank-
ruptcy of firms, weakening and eventually eliminating entire indus-
tries who are no longer around to contest regulation.
In addition to threatening sometimes catastrophic costs, environ-
mental regulations impose concentrated rather than diffuse costs. The
structure of modern environmental statutes virtually ensures that
firms within particular industries all face similar regulatory costs.
Under the Clean Air Act, for example, the regulation of air pollutants
from mobile sources—such as cars and trucks—depends on the vehi-
9. See Thomas Stratmann, The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting, 82
AM. ECON. REV. 1162, 1170 (1992).
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cle type and the pollutant. Firms within the industry making the same
products have the same regulatory compliance costs. For other indus-
tries, such as the electricity generating sector, the same is true. To see
how strong the tendency is for environmental regulations to impose
concentrated, versus diffuse costs, one needs only recall the EPA’s re-
fusal to regulate greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions according to the
letter of the Clean Air Act. Under the clear language of the Clean Air
Act, any stationary source emitting more than 100 or 250 tons of a
regulated pollutant must obtain a federal permit. Because this would
have subjected literally hundreds of thousands if not millions of busi-
nesses to GHG regulations, the EPA “reinterpreted” the statute to say
that for greenhouse gases, permits were required only for those source
emitting more than 100,000 tons per year.10 This drastically reduced
the number of businesses bearing the cost of the GHG regulations.
Targets of costly regulations have available a wide array of strate-
gies to prevent regulatory costs from being imposed on them. These
include strategies that are not available to those who bear the costs of
legislative carrots. First, as argued above, Congress passes vague legis-
lation in part so that members have an ongoing opportunity to influ-
ence the implementation of such vague statutory commands. Hence
when targeted industries lobby the relevant regulatory agency, such as
the EPA, to not regulate or regulate weakly, they may begin by calling
upon their congressional representatives for help.
Second, if such lobbying fails, and a costly regulation is finalized,
then regulatory targets can seek judicial review. While constitutional
standing for those who bear the costs of legislative carrots is always an
issue, standing for an industry or individual facing regulatory costs is,
if not completely certain, almost so.11 After all, to establish standing
to seek judicial review, a regulatory target just has to plead that it will
10. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2438 (2014).
11. See Charles H. Haake & Raymond B. Ludwiszewski, Standing Up for Industry
Standing in Environmental Regulatory Challenges, 42 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 305
(2015) (discussing a series of relatively recent decisions that the D.C. Circuit has at-
tempted to set out in an approach to industry standing, which would isolate the costs
of particular regulations from the cost of the regulatory program of which they are a
part, rejecting standing if the costs of the particular regulation are impossible to spec-
ify as sufficiently “concrete”); Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2438 (rejecting
this approach when it simply decided the substantive issues by rejecting the EPA’s so-
called tailoring rule, which would have re-interpreted the clear language of the Clean
Air Act requiring federally approved permits for any stationary source emitting more
than 100 or 250 tons of a pollutant to mean that for greenhouse gases, permits were
required only for those source emitting more than 100,000 tons per year); Haake &
Ludwiszewski, supra, at 330 (“[o]nce the Tailoring Rule was struck down, there was
no pillar with which the EPA could support the rest of its regulatory program. The
Supreme Court held that the EPA could not reasonably read the CAA’s PSD [Pre-
vention of Significant Deterioration] and Title V [stationary source permitting] provi-
sions as applying to GHG emissions precisely because the Agency lacked the
authority to ‘tailor’ the statute to make such a regulatory program work in practice.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL107.txt unknown Seq: 8  6-DEC-18 14:47
114 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
suffer a concrete injury from the regulation. Compliance costs consti-
tute a concrete injury.
As litigation against Obama-era GHG emission regulations proved,
however, the federal courts have become so deferential to agency as-
sessment of the science said to justify a regulation, and also of the
agency’s interpretation of a statute, that an industry plaintiff faces
long odds in getting an agency regulation reversed. Sometimes the
agency’s regulatory interpretation of the statute is so obviously con-
trary to the statutory language that a court will strike down the regula-
tory interpretation.12 But most often, Obama-era GHG regulations
survived judicial review.13
But there is a final venue for regulatory targets to challenge costly
regulation: the ballot box. The political accountability of executive
branch agencies is one of the two core justifications for judicial defer-
ence to agency interpretation and implementation of vague statutory
commands under Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council.14 If
people do not like a president’s regulatory agenda, they can change
that agenda by voting to replace that president with a new one. More-
over, it may well be that the incentive to impose electoral penalties on
politicians who have not reined in costly regulatory actions targeting
particular industries is greater, the bigger and more catastrophic are
those costs. After all, once an industry has been pushed into near
bankruptcy by regulations issued by a particular federal executive,
there is no more bargaining to be done with that executive. The only
thing to do is to replace the executive with a new one. While costly,
this is likely far easier than attempting to repeal some of the terms of
complex, multi-issue congressional legislation whose overall structure
represents an implicit deal among dozens of constituencies and hun-
dreds of representatives.
III. THE IMPERMANENCE OF COSTLY CLIMATE
REGULATORY STICKS
In a January 2008 interview with the San Francisco Chronicle edito-
rial board describing his climate change regulatory agenda, then-presi-
dential candidate Barack Obama said, “[s]o if somebody wants to
build a coal fired [electricity generating] plant they can. It’s just that it
12. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2443.
13. Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 121 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (holding that there was “substantial” evidence supporting the EPA’s finding
that GHG emissions were reasonably likely to endanger the public health or welfare,
ignoring arguments that the EPA’s finding was simply a long paraphrase of assess-
ment reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and that such defer-
ence by a U.S. regulator to a body appointed and controlled by officials of other
governments was never anticipated by Congress).
14. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
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will bankrupt them.”15 The Obama Administration’s regulatory
agenda did indeed take aim at coal-fired electricity utility generating
units and the U.S. coal industry more generally. Within a year of
Obama’s election, the Obama Administration EPA concluded that
GHG emissions were reasonably likely to endanger human health or
welfare.16 This endangerment finding was then the basis for a series of
further regulatory actions. The Obama era EPA regulated GHG emis-
sions from stationary air pollution sources under the Clean Air Act’s
(“CAA’s”) Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) program.
Under that program, new and modified major sources of air pollution
would be required to comply with the Best System of Emission Re-
duction (“BSER”) air pollution control standards. In the case of new
or modified coal burning electric utility generating plants, the EPA
declared that the BSER for new coal burning electric utility generat-
ing units was a boiler utilizing carbon capture and sequestration
(“CCS”) technology.17 Because there is no commercially available
CCS system for such plants, and no prospect for any such system in
the near or medium term, this PSD regulation was tantamount to re-
quiring that coal burning plants be replaced by natural gas fired facili-
ties.18 As for existing coal burning electricity generating units, the
EPA’s “Clean Power Plan” would have directed the states to imple-
ment steps to replace coal burning facilities with solar- and wind-pow-
ered electricity generation in order to dramatically reduce GHG
emissions from the power sector by 2030.19
In addition to targeting GHG emissions from coal burning power
plants, the Obama Administration’s EPA promulgated CAA regula-
tions imposing costly requirements on such plants to cut their emis-
sions of mercury and other air toxics, requiring reductions in
emissions of sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen (the Cross State Air
Pollution Rule), limiting coal waste in streams (the Stream Protection
Rule), and imposing a three-year moratorium on coal leases on fed-
eral lands, costlier standards for landfills where coal ash is disposed, a
15. Erica Martinson, Uttered in 2008, Still Haunting Obama, POLITICO (Apr. 5,
2012, 11:37 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2012/04/uttered-in-2008-still-haunting
-obama-in-2012-074892 [https://perma.cc/7QHL-JCHD].
16. 40 C.F.R. § 202(a) (2009).
17. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New,
Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units,
80 Fed. Reg. 64,510, 64,548 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R., pts. 60, 70, 71,
and 98).
18. After spending at least $7.5 billion, the Southern Company was ordered by
Mississippi regulators to cease construction on its Kemper CCS plant. The plant will
not be completed and will not be operated as a coal-burning plant. See Russell Grant-
ham, Southern Co. Hits Off Switch on ‘Clean Coal’ Experiment, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
(June 28, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/business/southern-hits-off-switch-clean-coal-ex-
periment/xepTP8eKYV31vHlQuVEQRO/ [https://perma.cc/B6A2-C9YS].
19. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Elec-
tric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,663 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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new occupational safety and health rule requiring that coal miners be
given costly real time monitors of their exposure to coal dust, and a
rule overriding traditional state authority under the CAA by directly
imposing federal standards limiting emissions from the burning of fos-
sil fuels at power plants and other industrial facilities in order to limit
“haze” at a group of U.S. national parks, monuments, and wilderness
areas.20 This long list of the Obama Administration’s regulatory ac-
tions targeting the coal industry did not all survive court challenges.
As noted above, the Supreme Court struck down part of the PSD rule
applied to existing coal burning electric generating facilities,21 and the
mercury and air toxics rule in its entirety.22 However, although cheap
natural gas was also responsible for the decline of the coal industry,
many blamed the raft of Obama Administration EPA regulations for
the loss of about 50,000 coal industry jobs over the period
2008–2012.23
These job losses were concentrated in two states, Kentucky and
West Virginia.24 For those who may question whether Presidents and
political parties are held politically accountable for regulatory actions,
West Virginia and Kentucky provide a very clear answer in the affirm-
ative. It is true that as the coal industry has declined over the last
several decades, so too has the influence of the strongly Democrat
coal miners’ union.25 However, by 2016, the Republican party had suc-
ceeded in persuading voters in these states that the Democrat party
was strongly committed to an anti-fossil fuel regulatory agenda, and
by 2018 both states—one, West Virginia, once solidly Democrat—
have become solidly Republican.26
With the election of President Trump in 2016, the entire Obama-era
regulatory attack on coal has been reversed. The Clean Power Plan is
in the process of being repealed,27 and the Trump Administration is
20. See The Obama Administration Targets Coal Every Which Way it Can, INST.
FOR ENERGY RES. (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/analy
sis/obama-administration-targets-coal-every-way-can/ [https://perma.cc/C4V8-3R5B]
(discussing the long list of targeted regulatory actions).
21. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014).
22. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015).
23. See Drew Haerer & Lincoln Pratson, Employment Trends in the U.S. Electric-
ity Sector, 2008–2012, 82 ENERGY POL’Y 85, 90 (2015) (discussing job loss).
24. Id. at 95.
25. Gary Harki, From Blue to Red: How the Decline of the Coal Union Helped
Republicans Have a Stronghold in West Virginia, 100 DAYS IN APPALACHIA, https://
www.100daysinappalachia.com/2017/02/15/blue-red-decline-coal-union-helped-west-
virginia-become-republican-stronghold/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
63AM-H3JY].
26. Id.
27. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,035 (Oct. 16, 2017)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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reviewing other rules—such as the Mercury and Air Toxics Rule28—
with every sign that they too will likely be repealed. Within a matter
of months, the Trump Administration has undone virtually the entire
complex package of regulatory sticks targeting the coal industry that
the Obama Administration promulgated.
This is not the first time that environmental regulatory actions im-
posing large costs on particular industries have been quickly rescinded
by a new Presidential Administration. Perhaps the most significant
opinion in contemporary administrative law, Motor Vehicles Manufac-
turers’ Assoc. v. State Farm, involved a decision by the newly elected
Reagan Administration to rescind a NHTSA regulation requiring the
installation of passive restraints (passive seat belts and airbags) in au-
tomobiles.29 Along with the Trump Administration’s actions to repeal
regulations targeting the coal industry, the State Farm facts illustrate
how quickly regulations imposing large costs concentrated on particu-
lar industries can be withdrawn with the election of a new President
supported by those industries.
The political economics within the executive branch and the regula-
tions it promulgates directly illustrate the impermanence of regulatory
sticks. With electoral contests rewarding presidential candidates for
relatively extreme regulatory positions, one would predict rapid sw-
ings in regulatory policy. Such swings are disciplined only by whatever
constraints are imposed by courts in judicial review of regulatory ac-
tion. With deferential courts, regulatory sticks are likely to exhibit
dramatic swings.
IV. LEGISLATIVE CARROTS THAT LAST AND LAST
While the Clean Power Plan and many other Obama-era CAA reg-
ulations targeting the coal burning electric utility industry will not be
implemented by the Trump Administration, the other side of the
Obama-era climate policy, federal financial support of various types
for renewable power, has displayed remarkable resiliency. Expiration
of funding under the 2009 stimulus (the American Reinvestment and
Recovery Act) led to a 23% decline in total federal energy subsidies.
Despite this, from 2010 through 2013, federal renewable energy subsi-
dies increased by 54%, from $8.6 billion to $13.2 billion.30 On a $/MW
28. Timothy Cama, Court Delays EPA Mercury Rule Case While Trump Reviews,
THE HILL (Apr. 27, 2017, 5:08 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/
330960-court-delays-epa-mercury-rule-case-while-trump-reviews [https://perma.cc/
NB6G-27CX].
29. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983).
30. James Conca, Why Do Federal Subsidies Make Renewable Energy So Costly?,
FORBES (May 30, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2017/05/
30/why-do-federal-subsidies-make-renewable-energy-so-costly/#507461a128ce [https:/
/perma.cc/XP2B-XZHK], see also Direct Federal Financial Interventions and Subsi-
dies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2016, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 24, 2018), https:/
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basis, solar received by far the largest subsidies of any electric power
source, getting roughly 300 times the subsidies for hydrocarbons and
nuclear before the expiration of ARRA funding and still 40 times
greater subsidies even after the expiration of the 2009 stimulus fund-
ing.31 Even more recently, despite attempts by some legislators to re-
move them, the tax reform package passed by Congress in 2018
retained tax credits for wind power generation through 2019, and simi-
lar credits for solar power generation through 2021. This legislation
also retained the $7,500 federal tax credit for consumers purchasing
electric cars.32
The United States is of course not alone in subsidizing renewable
energy. The state of California—whose economy is larger than the
vast majority of nation states in the world today—has aggressively
subsidized wind and solar power and the purchase of electric cars by
California consumers. In 2012, California voters passed Proposition
39, which allocates $2.5 billion (from a change in tax law) for clean
energy development, this on top of up to (potentially) $11 billion also
allocated to clean energy development from revenues from the sale of
“carbon allowances” under that state’s cap-and-trade program to re-
duce greenhouse gasses. Proposition 39 funding was generally viewed
as supplementing the California Solar Initiative (“CSI”), the state’s
key incentive for solar energy systems. With a $2.2 billion budget
spread over ten years, CSI’s total funding is close to Proposition 39’s
potential funding amount. The CSI program began in 2007 and has
been widely credited with creating an industry for solar rooftop in-
stallers.33 Rooftop solar installation in California steadily increased
until about 2016,34 when (due in part to a change in the way rooftop
solar production was credited to homeowners’ electricity bills) it
slowed significantly.35 Fueled by subsidies and mandates, by 2018, the
California solar industry employed more than 86,000 workers, and had
/www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/ [https://perma.cc/8294-MP45]; UNIV. TEX.
ENERGY INST., FEDERAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION TECH-
NOLOGIES 17 (2017), https://energy.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin_FCe_Sub
sidies_2018_Jan.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NDW-LRUQ].
31. UNIV. TEX. ENERGY INST., supra note 30, at 4.
32. Cassandra Sweet, What the New Tax Law Means for Renewables, GREENBIZ
(Jan. 11, 2018, 1:39 AM), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/what-new-tax-law-means-
renewables [https://perma.cc/3U2V-HWEE].
33. Rory Carroll, As U.S. Hesitates, California Pours Billions into Green Energy,
REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2012, 2:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-clean-energy-
california/as-u-s-hesitates-california-pours-billions-into-green-energy-idUSBRE8AD
0F720121115 [https://perma.cc/6AB2-W4VL].
34. See California Solar Statistics, GO SOLAR CAL., https://www.californiasolarsta
tistics.ca.gov/reports/monthly_stats/ (last updated Aug. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
K8LN-VNM4].
35. Trefis Team, Why the U.S. Residential Solar Market Has Slowed Down,
FORBES (June 2, 2017, 1:59 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2017/
06/02/why-the-u-s-residential-solar-market-has-slowed-down/#375fb0e31939 [https://
perma.cc/V8DA-TC5Y].
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accumulated sufficient political clout that the California Energy Com-
mission voted unanimously to require all new homes to install solar
panels.36
California also subsidizes the purchase of electric vehicles. Califor-
nia rebates $2,500 of the cost of an electric vehicle to the consumer
(and $1,500 of the cost of a hybrid car), and by February 2018 had
spent about $500 million in such rebates for 222,000 auto purchases.37
Under the Clean Vehicles Initiative (Assembly Bill 1184), the Califor-
nia rebate would have increased to $10,000 at point of purchase. That
bill would have spent $3 billion, almost six times more than the nearly
$500 million California has spent on electric vehicle rebates. A pri-
mary motivation for the bill was the fear that the $7,500 federal tax
credit for the purchase of an electric vehicle would expire in 2017.
When it became clear that the federal rebate would be renewed, sup-
port for another $3 billion subsidy for electric vehicles diminished in
the California legislature. But there is every reason to expect continu-
ing pressure for an increase in California’s electric vehicle rebate. The
federal rebate for electric vehicle purchases now expires when a man-
ufacturer sells 200,000 such vehicles, making additional Tesla and
General Motors electric vehicle sales ineligible.38 Moreover, an in-
crease in California’s subsidy continues to be justified by the vast ex-
isting shortfall between the 324,000 electric vehicles sold in California
thus far and the state’s goal of selling 1.5 million electric vehicles by
2025.39
These U.S. and California renewable subsidies and mandates are
relatively recent legislative programs. However, there is an older pro-
gram, the federal ethanol mandate, whose history carries important
lessons regarding the political hurdles in eliminating such subsidies
and mandates, even when they are widely recognized as having failed
to achieve any of their stated legislative goals.
A. The Ethanol Mandate
The use of ethanol as a gasoline additive came about because it was
a substitute for methyl tertiary butyl ether (“MTBE”). Ironically, per-
haps, the market demand for MTBE was itself entirely a creature of
36. Ivan Penn, California Will Require Solar Power for New Homes, N.Y. TIMES
(May 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/business/energy-environment/cali
fornia-solar-power.html (last updated Aug. 14, 2018) [https://perma.cc/36J7-GTEV].
37. CVRP Rebate Statistics, CLEAN VEHICLE REBATE PROJECT, https://cleanvehi
clerebate.org/eng/rebate-statistics [https://perma.cc/6YDW-K5N7].
38. James B. Stewart, Electric Vehicle Tax Credit Survives, But G.M. and Tesla
Aren’t Cheering, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/busi
ness/electric-vehicles-taxes-tesla-gm.html [https://perma.cc/8YZK-YJ5Q].
39. Rob Nikolewski, Plan to Spend $3B For Electric Car Rebates Dies in Legisla-
ture, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., (Sept. 7, 2017, 1:40 PM), http://www.sandiegounion
tribune.com/business/sd-fi-ting-bill-20170907-story.html [https://perma.cc/V76H-
ESKF].
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regulatory sticks.40 One of the earliest actions taken by the EPA in
actually implementing the 1972 CAA was to ban lead as a perform-
ance-enhancing additive from gasoline. Refiners responded in the late
1970’s by substituting MTBE for lead. Demand for MTBE was further
enhanced by the 1990 CAA Amendments, which required the use of
reformulated gasoline in heavily polluted urban areas with severe
summertime ground level ozone pollution.41 MTBE turned out to
solve both the ozone problem in those places and the wintertime car-
bon monoxide pollution problem that beset other urban areas. It also
produced large reductions in auto emissions of benzene, various ox-
ides of nitrogen, and the volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”) that
react with sunlight to create summertime ozone.
In the early 2000’s, however, a number of cities such as Santa
Monica, California, discovered that MTBE had leaked from refin-
eries’ underground storage tanks and contaminated city water sup-
plies. Lawsuits followed, and by 2005, a group of large gasoline
refiners was on the verge of paying almost a half billion dollars to
public water providers in seventeen states for the alleged harm done
by MTBE groundwater contamination. Despite evidence that
MTBE—a relatively low potency VOC—was rarely detected in drink-
ing water, and when detected was found in only very tiny amounts,42
by 2005, over two dozen states had banned MTBE as a gasoline
additive.
Like MTBE, ethanol-blended gasoline reduces auto “tailpipe”
emissions of carbon monoxide, VOCs, and benzene. With bans on
MTBE, ethanol emerged as a natural market substitute to MTBE for
CAA compliance. Ethanol is also known as ethyl alcohol and is com-
monly produced by fermenting starches released from milled bios-
tocks—in the U.S., most commonly corn. This process produces both
beverage and fuel grade ethanol. The Model T, produced by Ford in
40. See Thomas O. McGarity, MTBE: A Precautionary Tale, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 281, 337 (2004).
41. MTBE, Oxygenates, and Motor Gasoline, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://
www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/special/pdf/mtbe.pdf  (last updated Mar. 6, 2000) [https://
perma.cc/6LKU-RFRQ] (“The reformulated gasoline (RFG) program [created by the
CAA Amendments of 1990] requires reductions in automobile emissions of ozone-
forming volatile organic compounds during the summer high-ozone season, and of
toxic air pollutants and nitrogen oxides during the entire year in certain areas of the
United States. Reformulated gasoline requires a minimum 2.1 percent oxygen by
weight when averaging, which corresponds to approximately 11.7 volume percent
MTBE or 5.8 volume percent ethanol.”).
42. Pamela R. D. Williams et al., The Risk of MTBE Relative to Other VOC’s in
Public Drinking Water in California, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 621, 621 (2004); Pamela R. D.
Williams, MTBE in California’s Public Drinking Water Wells: Have Past Predictions
Come True?, 12 ENVTL. FORENSICS 270, 288 (2011) (finding that over the period
1996–2011, MTBE was detected (at least once) in California public drinking water
wells at a rate of only from 0.4 to 0.9%) (“[D]espite repeated sampling, MTBE has
been detected in only 1 or 2 years for most public drinking water wells that have ever
been found to contain MTBE at any concentration level.”).
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1908, was actually designed to run on fuel grade ethanol, gasoline, or a
blend of the two.43
Production costs of ethanol are high relative to gasoline, however,
and it was not until the oil crisis of the 1970’s that the federal govern-
ment began to subsidize ethanol to lower U.S. dependence on im-
ported oil. The oldest significant subsidy was a federal tax credit
(more precisely, an exemption) that originated with the Energy Tax
Act of 1978.44 This gave ethanol producers a $0.40 per gallon tax ex-
emption from the gasoline excise tax.45 In 1982, the Surface Transpor-
tation Act increased the gasoline excise tax to $0.09 per gallon, but
also increased the ethanol exemption to $0.60 per gallon.46 In 1990,
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act decreased the ethanol ex-
emption from $0.60 to $0.54, but also extended the tax credit to
2000.47 In 1998, the Transportation Efficiency Act of the 21st Century
further reduced the ethanol tax exemptions to $0.51 per gallon but
extended it to last until 2007.48 Finally, in 2004, with the passage of the
American Jobs Creation Act, Congress created the Volumetric Etha-
nol Excise Tax Credit (“VEETC”). The VEETC changed the ethanol
subsidy from an excise tax exemption to a blender tax credit. The
VEETC gave ethanol blenders (primarily large oil companies) a $0.51
per gallon tax credit for ethanol blended with gasoline that had at
least 10% ethanol. In 2008, the VEETC was renewed but lowered to
$0.45 per gallon of ethanol.49 It is estimated that in 2009 alone, the
VEETC cost U.S. taxpayers $5.16 billion.50
Despite this long history of federal subsidies, as of 2004, ethanol
production in the U.S. was only at 120,000 barrels per day, far short of
the 187,000 barrels per day production level necessary for it to entirely
replace MTBE as a gasoline additive.51 However, not long after the
passage of the VEETC, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct”) was
enacted.52 With this law, Congress created a new demand for ethanol
production that dwarfed the demand for ethanol as an MTBE replace-
ment (and made the VEETC largely redundant, yet that tax credit
43. Amy Diggs, The Expiration of the Ethanol Tax Credit: An Analysis of Costs
and Benefits, 19 POL’Y PERSP. 47, 47 (2000).
44. See A History of Federal Support for the Ethanol Industry, ALTERNATIVEEN-
ERGYSOURCESINFO.COM, http://www.alternativeenergysourcesinfo.com/ethanol-subsi
dies-history.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/W2NZ-YML3].
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Diggs, supra note 43, at 48–49.
50. The VEETC expired in 2011. The Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit: His-
tory and Current Policy, TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE (Apr. 2011), https://www.
taxpayer.net/agriculture/the-volumetric-ethanol-excise-tax-credit-history-and-current-
policy/ [https://perma.cc/KPA7-H38G].
51. See McGarity, supra note 40, at 290.
52. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.
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lasted until 2011). The EPAct required 7.5 billion gallons of renewable
fuel to be blended into gasoline by 2012, and the Energy Indepen-
dence and Security Act of 200753 (“EISA”) quadrupled the amount of
required renewable fuel to 36 billion gallons by 2022.54 The EPAct was
charged with implementing the renewable fuel standard (“RFS”), and
it steadily increased the amount of required renewable fuel blending,
reaching 15.2 billion gallons for 2012, far exceeding the statutory goal
of 7.5 billion gallons.55 While ethanol-blended gasoline is not the only
way to meet the RFS in these laws, by 2016, it had become by far the
most popular, with more than 95% of the automobile fuel sold in the
U.S. consisting of 90% gasoline and 10% ethanol.56
The RFS is not the only federal mandate or subsidy increasing the
demand for or supply of ethanol. According to the U.S. Department
of Energy, there are now almost two dozen federal laws that create
incentives for ethanol production.57 However, the RFS in particular
amounted to massive shift outward in the demand for ethanol.
This shift in demand had predictable consequences. The producer
price index for ethanol jumped by 24.8% in 2006.58 Even after suppli-
ers responded by adding ethanol refining capacity, the ethanol price
index increased another 6.7% in 2007 and 8.9% in 2008.59 By 2010,
farmers diverted such large share of corn to ethanol production that
ethanol prices fell by 8.3%, while animal feed prices rose by 7.3%.
From 2005–2014, ethanol prices increased by 38% (an annual increase
of 4.8%).60
B. Ethanol and the Demand for Corn
As a matter of chemistry, it is possible to produce ethanol from a
variety of plant feedstocks. However, the only two feedstocks that
53. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat.
1492.
54. Id. at 1522. EISA also added diesel fuel to the renewables mandate program,
set volume requirements for specific categories of renewable fuel, such as cellulistic
ethanol, and required the EPA to apply lifecycle greenhouse gas performance stan-
dards to different renewable fuels.
55. Renewable Fuel Annual Standards, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/renewable-fuel-annual-standards
(last visited Aug. 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9KJH-7TE4].
56. See Almost All U.S. Gasoline is Blended with 10% Ethanol, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (May 4, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=26092
[https://perma.cc/G2LY-PK3K].
57. See Federal Laws and Incentives for Ethanol, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://
www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/laws/ETH/US (last updated Apr. 21, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/QZ2G-3GQD].
58. Wander Ceden˜o, Beyond the Numbers: What Happened to Ethanol Producer
Prices After Passage of the Renewable Fuel Standard?, 5 U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. 4
(July 2016), https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-5/pdf/what-happened-to-ethanol-
producer-prices-after-passage-of-the-renewable-fuel-standard.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7W7L-JQ8U].
59. Id.
60. Id.
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have proven to be economically feasible for mass production are those
that are sucrose- or starch-based.61 In the U.S., sugarcane and sugar
beets, sucrose-based feedstocks, are produced in only limited areas of
the country and are very expensive to use for ethanol because they
command high prices in the food market. Corn has relatively cheap
production costs, can be grown in many areas of the country, and is
less valuable for food. Therefore, corn has emerged as the lowest cost
starch-based feedstock for ethanol in the U.S.
According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, corn used for
ethanol increased from about 1.5 billion bushels in 2005 to 4.1 billion
bushels in 2009, a 170% increase.62 Indeed, although total corn pro-
duction increased by 3.2 billion bushels between 2000–2009, corn used
for ethanol increased by 3.9 billion bushels. Whereas in 2005, only
about 18% of the domestic corn supply went to ethanol, by 2014, 44%
of U.S. corn production was used for ethanol.63 Since the increase in
corn used in ethanol accounted for more than the total increase in
production, with corn yields (bushels per acre) constant over this pe-
riod, corn production was diverted from other uses (such as food pro-
duction) and farmers increased the amount of land planted with
corn.64 Economic simulation studies predicted that most of the in-
crease in corn production would come from farmers switching from
planting soybeans to planting corn.65 USDA researchers found that
this prediction was confirmed, at least for the two-year period
2006–2008, when 53% of the increase in acres planted with corn came
from soybean farms.66 However, the largest percentage increase in
corn acreage occurred on cotton and wheat farms.67 Nationally, more-
over, soybean acreage did not fall over the 2006–2008 period.68 While
there was a big shift toward corn and away from soybeans in the tradi-
tional corn belt states such as Iowa, Nebraska, Illinois, and Minnesota,
there was an increase in soybean acreage and an even larger increase
in corn acreage in more arid, wheat belt states such as Kansas and
South Dakota (states that are now referred to as part of the “western
corn belt”).69
61. Landon Stevens et al., Ethanol and Renewable Fuel Standard, INST. POL.
ECON. 5, http://www.strata.org/wp-content/uploads/ipePublications/Ethanol-and-RFS-
Full-Report.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6YH2-4HYH].
62. Id.
63. Ceden˜o, supra note 58, at 2.
64. Steven Wallander, et al., The Ethanol Decade: An Expansion of U.S. Corn
Production, 2000-09, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. 3 (Aug. 2011), https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/
bitstream/117982/2/EIB79.pdf [https://perma.cc/43HF-WT5D].
65. Id. at 8.
66. A two-year period was studied in order to control for typically annual crop
rotations.
67. Wallander et al., supra note 64, at 8–11.
68. Id. at 8.
69. Id. at 6.
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C. The Costs of Corn Ethanol
1. Limited Greenhouse Gas Reductions but Big Increases in Corn
Prices and Acreage Devoted to Corn Production
Over the years of ethanol subsidies, evidence has mounted that the
environmental benefits of ethanol subsidies are likely much smaller
than originally hoped and not worth their cost. The primary environ-
mental benefit from blending ethanol into gasoline is a reduction in
net carbon-dioxide emissions, relative to gasoline. The net reduction
occurs because although burning ethanol, just like burning gasoline,
releases CO2, corn plants used to produce ethanol absorb CO2 each
year as they grow. But just as with petroleum production, the ethanol
production process itself emits CO2 at several stages: growing the
corn, transporting it to ethanol refineries, converting corn to ethanol
at those refineries, and distributing and blending ethanol with gaso-
line. According to one study, even when blended at 30% rates, CO2
emissions from production and conversion of corn-based ethanol are
so high that there is little potential overall reduction in CO2
emissions.70
Moreover, whether corn-based ethanol lowers CO2 emission rela-
tive to gasoline depends upon what was being done with the cropland
before corn was grown on it. Work indicates that when the land was
previously uncultivated, as in the U.S Conservation Reserve Program
(“CRP”), even corn-based ethanol produced by low CO2 emission
natural gas-powered refineries have higher lifecycle CO2 emissions
than gasoline.71 Simulation studies predicted that CRP land, as well as
carbon rich grasslands, would be converted to corn production as a
result of the RFS, and there is evidence that this is exactly what oc-
curred.72 One study found that over the 2008–2012 period, corn crops
expanded to grasslands and lands that had not been used for agricul-
70. Bo Zhang et al., Optimizing Blendstock Composition and Ethanol Feedstock to
Reduce Gasoline Well-to-Pump CO2 Emission, 105 ENERGY PROCEDIA 3642, 3643
(2017); see Brian C. Murray et al., How Effective are Renewable Energy Subsidies in
Cutting U.S. Greenhouse Gases?, 104 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 569, 572–73
(2014) (looking more generally at the effect of subsidies and tax breaks for renew-
ables, observing that another reason that the ethanol subsidy has not lowered CO2
emissions is that the subsidy lowers the price of gasoline, “leading to a classic rebound
effect that increases emissions from higher gasoline use”).
71. Jason Hill et al., Climate Change and Health Costs of Air Emissions from Bi-
ofuels and Gasoline, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2077, 2078 (2009).
72. Silvia Secchi & Bruce A. Babcock, Impact of High Corn Prices on Conserva-
tion Reserve Program Acreage, 13 IOWA AGRIC. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (finding that even at
$3 per bushel corn prices, almost 40%of existing land in the CRP would be taken out
of that program and devoted to corn production); XIAOGUANG CHENA & MADHU
KHANNAB, INDIRECT LAND USE EFFECTS OF CORN ETHANOL IN THE U.S: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR THE CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM 5 (2014).
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ture since the early 1970’s and were less suitable for agriculture.73 As
discussed earlier, the USDA found a marked movement of corn and
soy cultivation into dryer western corn belt areas in North Dakota,
South Dakota, Nebraska, Minnesota, and Iowa. Confirming this,
Wright and Wimberly found that over the 2006–2011 period in this
region, about one million acres of grasslands with high-erosion risk
and drought vulnerability were converted to corn or soy production.74
Conversion to corn production of grasslands and lands that would
otherwise be in CRP entails a host of environmental costs, not only
carbonization (as carbon sinks are lost) but also the destruction of
ecosystems and the value they confer, including the loss of recrea-
tional hunting and tourism opportunities.75 And these are not the only
environmental costs of corn-based ethanol. Hill et al. found that re-
gardless of whether an ethanol refinery is powered by natural gas,
coal, or corn stover, fine particulate (PM 2.5) emissions from the life-
cycle ethanol-production process are higher than from the gasoline
production process.76
Given the serious environmental costs and limited or non-existent
efficacy of corn-based ethanol in reducing GHG emissions, it is per-
haps unsurprising that American environmentalists have turned
strongly against the federal ethanol subsidies.77 In addition to the
harmful environmental effects just mentioned, environmentalists have
criticized ethanol as reducing gasoline mileage in automobiles, con-
tributing to declining bee populations, and adding toxic pollutants into
drinking water.78 On the other hand, environmentalists’ original
hope—that ethanol subsidies would eventually move from supporting
environmentally harmful corn-based ethanol to environmentally help-
ful biofuels such as cellulosic ethanol—has proven to be chimerical.
By the spring of 2018, environmentalists such as the National Wildlife
Federation were supporting a Democrat-sponsored bill that would
phase out the corn-ethanol subsidy as part of the RFS.79
73. Tyler J. Lark, J. Meghan Salmon & Holly K. Gibbs, Cropland Expansion Out-
paces Agricultural and Biofuel Policies in the United States, 10 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 6
(2015).
74. Christopher K. Wright & Michael C. Wimberly, Recent Land Use Change in
the Western Corn Belt Threatens Grasslands and Wetlands, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. 4134, 4134–38 (2013).
75. Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases
Greenhouse Gases through Emissions from Land-Use Change, 319 SCI. 1238, 1238
(2008).
76. Hill et al., supra note 71, at 2077.
77. C. Ford Runge, The Case Against More Ethanol: It’s Simply Bad for Environ-
ment, YALE ENV’T 360 (May 25, 2016), https://e360.yale.edu/features/the_case_against
_ethanol_bad_for_environment [https://perma.cc/5KUV-K2X9].
78. See id.; Emily Cassidy, More Ethanol Means More Toxic Water Pollution,
AGMAG (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.ewg.org/agmag/2016/01/more-ethanol-means-
more-toxic-water-pollution#.Wy1Xu6knb64 [https://perma.cc/EJ5U-VSVB].
79. Ben Wolfgang, Environmental Groups Back Ted Cruz, Republicans on Over-
haul of Renewable Fuel Standard, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://
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The environment was not the only loser from the federal ethanol
mandate. As can be seen from Figure 1 below, corn prices increased
rapidly between 2006–2008, the period after the RFS was enacted and
then expanded.80 To be sure, the ethanol mandate is not the only thing
determining corn prices. Weather fluctuations—such as the severe
drought that contracted supply and increased price in 2012—can cause
big short-term price changes. Over longer periods, international de-
mand impacts prices—especially demand from China, where domestic
$9–10 corn price supports are so high that since 2013, massive
amounts of corn have been imported from the U.S. (despite 65% tar-
iffs imposed on imports over quotas).81 Still, using a variety of meth-
ods, researchers have estimated that the ethanol mandate in the RFS
increased corn prices by 20–30%.82 Thus, the ethanol mandate directly
harmed consumers.
FIGURE 1
Corn Prices (Per Bushel) Since 1998
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/mar/15/renewable-fuel-standard-promoting-
ethanol-shunned-/ [https://perma.cc/SAY8-P5FM].
80. Corn Prices-45 Year Historical Chart, MACROTRENDS, http://www.macrotrends
.net/2532/corn-prices-historical-chart-data (last visited Aug. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
8GRP-6QP3].
81. Qianrong Wu & Wendong Zhang, Of Maize and Markets: China’s New Corn
Policy, CARD AGRIC. POL’Y REV., (2016), https://www.card.iastate.edu/ag_policy_re
view/article/?a=59 [https://perma.cc/PR9G-5TDD].
82. Catherine Hausman et al., Farm Acreage Shocks and Crop Prices: An SVAR
Approach to Understanding the Impacts of Biofuels, 53 ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 117,
118, 119 (2012); Michael J. Roberts & Wolfram Schlenker, Identifying Supply and
Demand Elasticities of Agricultural Commodities: Implications for the U.S. Ethanol
Mandate 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15921, 2013); Colin
Carter et al., The Effect of the U.S. Ethanol Mandate on Corn Prices 1, 33 (2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with UC Davis Department of Agricultural and
Resource).
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2. Ethanol Mandates and the Automobile Gasoline Market
Beyond increasing corn acreage and corn prices, the RFS impacted
the gasoline refining market. To fully understand the impact of the
RFS on refiners requires a bit more detail on how the RFS mandate
actually has been implemented by the EPA. The RFS mandate under
EISA actually consists of a number of “nested” mandates within the
overall renewable fuel mandate.83 The law mandates the use of “ad-
vanced biofuels.” One advanced biofuel is biodiesel, which has spe-
cific mandated amounts. As shown in Figure 2 below, “advanced
biofuels” also include cellulosic biofuels.84
FIGURE 2
RFS Under the 2007 EISA
(a) RFS2 Mandates (b) Nested Mandate Structure
Note
of the mandate.
While the EISA sets mandated amounts of different biofuels, the
EPA administers the program and has discretion in setting annual
mandates. Figure 3 below shows the amounts of various renewable
fuels that the EISA required and actually ordered by the EPA pursu-
ant to rulemakings.85 Note that the EISA does not set any required
amount of corn ethanol. Instead, the “mandate” for corn ethanol is
implicit, equal to the difference between the total renewable fuel man-
date and the advanced biofuel mandate.
83. Giancarlo Moschini et al., The Renewable Fuel Standard in Competitive Equi-
librium: Market and Welfare Effects, 99 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1117, 1119 (2017).
84. Gabriel E. Lade et al., Policy Shocks and Market-Based Regulations: Evidence
from the Renewable Fuel Standard 4, 6 (Ctr. for Agric. & Rural Dev., Working Paper
16-WP 565, 2016), https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?refererHTtps://
www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1584&context=card_workingpapers [https://
perma.cc/8HU3-29MN].
85. Moschini et al., supra note 83.
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FIGURE 3
Statutory Mandates, EPA Final Rulings, and
2022 Scenario (Billions of Gallons)
Note: Superscript aindicates that biodiesel is produced as needed (assumed to be the marginal advanced fuel); bindicates a linear trend projection based on
2014-2017 EPA rulings (R2 = 0.998). All quantities are in ethanol-equivalent gallons except for biodiesel, which are in physical volume.
As can also be seen from Figure 3, since 2015, the amount of renew-
able fuel that the EPA has actually required varies tremendously from
what Congress required in the EISA. That law gives the EPA author-
ity to waive the mandated amount, and the EPA has exercised that
authority to drastically reduce the required amount of advanced bi-
ofuels, in particular more or less zeroing out the cellulosic ethanol re-
quirement.86 Cellulosic ethanol is produced from cellulose, sugars on
the cell walls of plants. Cellulosic ethanol can be produced from a
variety of feedstock crops, such as switchgrass. The problem is that the
cost of producing cellulosic ethanol has been prohibitive, and the ex-
isting technology and production capacity are far too small to meet
the cellulosic-ethanol goals of the EISA.87 Faced with this reality,
whereas the EISA called for 5.5 billion gallons of cellulosic ethanol in
2017, the EPA required only 0.311 billion gallons.88
The only advanced biofuel to reach commercial viability is bi-
odiesel. Biodiesel is made by refining a variety of feedstocks, includ-
ing recycled cooking oil, soybean oil, and animal fats. In fact, U.S.
monthly biodiesel production rose from just over 60 million gallons in
December 200989 to nearly 150 million gallons in December 2017.90
86. EPA’s waiver authority is created by Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7545
(o)(7)(A) (2012).
87. See M. Woodson & C.J. Jablonowski, An Economic Assessment of Traditional
and Cellulosic Ethanol Technologies, 3 ENERGY SOURCES 372, 373 (2008).
88. Robert Rapier, Cellulosic Ethanol Falling Short of the Hype, FORBES (Feb. 11,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2018/02/11/cellulosic-ethanol-falling-far-
short-of-the-hype/#666b707d505f [https://perma.cc/DZ7R-G5ZW] (stating that EISA
called for 5.5 billion gallons of cellulosic ethanol in 2017); Renewable Fuel Standard
Program: Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2017, and the Biomass-Based Diesel
Volume for 2018, EPA,https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/final-
renewable-fuel-standards-2017-and-biomass-based-diesel-volume (last visited Sept.
14, 2018) [https://perma.cc/X8BE-K85N] (stating that the EPA required only 0.311
billion gallons of cellulosic ethanol in 2017).
89. Monthly Biodiesel Production Report Archives, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(May 4, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/biofuels/biodiesel/production/archive/2011/
2011_12/biodiesel.php [https://perma.cc/3X8U-SFXE].
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As can be seen from Figure 3, recognizing that biodiesel is the only
commercially available advanced biofuel, the EPA has steadily in-
creased the biodiesel mandate.
For present purposes, the various renewable fuel types under the
EISA matter because the mandates for different categories are an im-
portant determinant of the cost to regulated entities of meeting the
RFS mandate. The regulated entities under the EISA are refiners,
blenders, and importers of gasoline and diesel. Each year, the EPA
determines a blend requirement for these entities by dividing the
amount of each type of fuel specified in its final rule by projected
gasoline and diesel sales for the year.91 For example, if the EPA re-
quired one billion gallons of biodiesel for a particular year and esti-
mated that 100 billion gallons of gasoline would be sold, then each
refiner or blender would be obliged to buy biodiesel equal to 1% of its
gasoline sales. This amount is known as the renewable volume obliga-
tion (“RVO”).92 Under EPA regulations, this obligation can be met by
either buying that amount of biodiesel, or buying Renewable Identifi-
cation Numbers (“RINs”).93 Every gallon of biofuel produced or im-
ported in the U.S. generates an RIN, a credit that is detached from the
biofuel as soon as it is sold or blended. Under this trading scheme, a
refiner or blender can comply with the RFS mandate by either buying
and blending its required amount, or buying RINs from other refiners
and blenders. In this Article’s biofuel example, the refiner can either
buy and blend biodiesel equal to 1% of its sales, or instead blend no
biodiesel but buy biodiesel RINs equal to 1% of its gasoline sales.
RIN ‘types’ correspond to the biofuel categories described above.
Conventional RINs (called D6 RINs) generated by corn ethanol may
be applied only toward the total renewable fuel mandate. Biodiesel
RINs (called D4 RINs) can be applied to meet any of the mandates—
biodiesel, advanced, or the total renewable fuel requirement.94 Up un-
til 2013, regulated entities over-complied with the total RFS mandate,
accumulating about 2.6 billion gallons in banked conventional RINs
by 2013.95 This can be seen from Figure 4 below, which compares gas-
oline prices to the price of a conventional corn-based ethanol RIN. As
90. Monthly Biodiesel Production Report Archives, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/biofuels/biodiesel/production/archive/2017/
2017_12/biodiesel.php [https://perma.cc/K548-CT3D].
91. Gabriel E. Lade et al., Ex Post Costs and Renewable Identification Number
(RIN) Prices Under the Renewable Fuel Standard 5 (Res. for the Future, Discussion
Paper No. 15-22, 2015), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/
RFF-DP-15-22.pdf [https://perma.cc/CPD8-NQ4Z] [hereinafter Lade et al., Ex Post
Costs and RIN Prices].
92. Id. at 5–6.
93. Id. at 6. There is some leeway, as the EPA allows up to 20% of RIN’s gener-
ated in a given year to be banked and used in the following year, and there is a one-
time only option for a firm to carry a deficit in RIN’s over to the next year.
94. Id. at 19 n.28.
95. Id. at 6.
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can be seen from the Figure, the price of conventional ethanol RINs
was essentially zero until 2013.
To understand the 2013 RIN price spike, we must step back a bit.
The demand for ethanol as a gasoline additive is limited by the fact
that virtually all gasoline in the United States has 10% ethanol. This is
the maximum quantity of ethanol that conventional automobile en-
gines can burn. There are very few cars that can run on the much
higher 85% ethanol blend (so-called flex fuel). At 10%, the higher-
octane benefit of ethanol approximately offsets its lower energy con-
tent.96 Hence, at a 10% mix, ethanol is almost a perfect substitute for
gasoline, and when the ethanol price equals the market price of gaso-
line, regulated entities break even on their ethanol purchases. De-
mand for ethanol is perfectly elastic at such a price, up until the
ethanol “blend wall” is met. The blend wall is the point where the
total quantity of ethanol purchased equals 10% of expected gasoline
sales.97 Beyond this point there is only a very small, albeit price-elastic
demand for ethanol used in 15% and 85% blends.
Whether the market demand for ethanol is above or below the EPA
mandated amount depends both on what the EPA mandates and on
the market demand for 10% ethanol gasoline. If the market demand
for gasoline is sufficiently high, the EPA conventional RFS mandate
does not matter, as 10% of market gasoline demand—market-deter-
mined ethanol demand—exceeds what the EPA requires. In this case,
RINs for conventional ethanol have no value and a zero price. As
shown in Figure 4 below, this is the situation that prevailed in the
ethanol RIN market from 2008 until 2013.98
However, if the ethanol mandate increases sufficiently to be above
the market-determined blend wall, it becomes physically impossible
for regulated entities to meet their conventional ethanol obligation by
buying ethanol (or D6 RINs). This is what occurred in 2013. In a pro-
posed rule issued in January 2013, the EPA maintained the EISA’s
overall biofuel mandate for 2013, pushing the level close to or above
the conventional 10% ethanol blend wall.99 This apparently defied in-
dustry expectations that the EPA’s long delay in releasing the rule
signaled it would relax the mandate.100
To avoid being out of compliance, the RFS allows entities to use
higher-ranked RINs, biodiesel RINs, to meet their conventional etha-
nol mandate. Up until 2013, the RFS total mandated amount of bi-
odiesel was relatively high, leading to high biodiesel prices and high
96. Scott Irwin, Fixing the RFS is Getting Easier and Easier, FARMDOCDAILY 2
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2018/02/fixing-the-rfs-is-getting-easier
-and-easier.html [https://perma.cc/RC9N-UXP4].
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Lade et al., Ex Post Costs and RIN Prices, supra note 91, at 21.
100. Id.
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biodiesel D4 RINs. Indeed, at their peak in 2011, biodiesel prices
reached almost $6 per gallon, and in ethanol equivalents (adjusted ac-
cording to EPA weight factors such as impacts on GHG emissions) D4
RINs were $2 per gallon.101 What happened in 2013 is that the bi-
odiesel D4 RINs were seen by regulated entities as the only way to
meet the conventional ethanol mandate, making biodiesel the margi-
nal fuel for meeting the ethanol mandate. Hence, as shown in Figure
4, after 2013, prices for conventional D6 RINs roughly equaled prices
for D4 biodiesel RINs.102
FIGURE 4
Weekly D4 (Biodiesel) and D6 (Ethanol) RINs
Price 2007–2018103
Between December 2012 and July 2013, the cost of the required
bundle of RINs—representing the mandated quantities of various re-
newable fuel categories—increased from around $0.01 cent per gallon
to more than $0.14 per gallon.104 What one commentator has called
the “shock factor”105 of this dramatic, 1,400% change in regulated en-
101. Irwin, supra note 96, at 4.
102. See Lade et al., Ex Post Costs and RIN Prices, supra note 91, at 19 (analyzing
the efficiency of the RIN market’s response).
103.  Irwin, supra note 96, at 1.
104. See Lade et al., Ex Post Costs and RIN Prices, supra note 91, at 16–17 (discuss-
ing the sharp increase of RIN prices from January 2013 to July 2013).
105. Scott Irwin, How Much Will the Cost of a RINs Bundle Decline if the Conven-
tional Ethanol Gap Disappears?, FARMDOCDAILY 4 (Feb. 23, 2018), https://farm
docdaily.illinois.edu/2018/02/how-much-will-the-cost-of-a-rins-bundle-decline.html
[https://perma.cc/3DPY-ZB74].
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tities’ cost of complying with the RFS mandate reverberates still in
2018. RIN prices have steadily increased since 2014 to the point where
the RFS compliance cost—determined on the margin by the cost of
biodiesel RINs—amounts to a non-negligible tax on gasoline and die-
sel refiners.
Biodiesel is a very expensive way to reduce carbon-dioxide emis-
sions. As Meiselman explained, the marginal cost curve of biodiesel
rises steeply and because it is an almost perfect substitute for petro-
leum-based diesel, it can remain competitive with such petroleum-
based diesel only if the blender cost of petroleum diesel rises along
with the blender cost of biodiesel.106 However, the blender cost of pe-
troleum diesel is relatively constant. Recent work finds that when bi-
odiesel RINs determine the marginal cost of complying with the RFS,
there are large losses of diesel fuel consumer surplus.107 In practical
terms, since in the U.S. “diesel fuel consumers” are mostly heavy
trucks and trains, their increased cost will likely be passed through to
consumers.
Therefore, if the EPA continues toughening the RFS mandate—as
the original 2007 EISA requires—with correspondingly high gasoline
production—it is likely that gasoline refiners could not meet the RFS
mandate with conventional corn ethanol, unless gasoline prices re-
mained at the very low levels seen in 2014–2016. The so-called “blend
wall” would bind, and refiners and producers could meet the RFS
mandate only by buying much more expensive biodiesel RINs. Gaso-
line prices have been rising since 2016 (see Figure 5 below).108 This
means that the marginal cost of complying with the RFS will continue
to be determined by the cost of biodiesel RINs.
106. Ben Meiselman, Breaching the Blendwall: RINs and the Market for Renewa-
ble Fuel 3–4 (Feb. 25, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with University of
Michigan).
107. Christina Korting et al., Who Will pay for Increasing Biofuel Mandates? Inci-
dence of the Renewable Fuel Standards Given a Binding Blend Wall 40 (2017), https://
dyson.cornell.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/documents/Korting%2C%20de%
20Gorter%20and%20Just%20(2017)%20WP.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7R2-W23W].
108. Weekly U.S. Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Price, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?f=W&n=PET&s
=EMM_EPMR_PTE_NUS_DPG (last visited Aug. 23, 2018) [https://perma.cc/H7Y9-
7VUW].
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FIGURE 5
Retail Gasoline Prices Since 1990
3. Political Arithmetic: Ethanol Costs Likely Vastly Exceed
Benefits, Environmentalists and Conservatives Support
Repealing the RFS, yet the RFS Survives
Economists’ early work attempting to assess the social costs and
benefits of alternative renewable fuel policies tended to conclude that
mandates such as the RFS might increase social welfare.109 That work,
however, did not foresee the predominance of corn ethanol and its
effect in drastically increasing food prices and incentivizing the over-
cultivation of marginal or otherwise uncultivated farmlands. Nor did it
foresee that the marginal cost of RFS compliance would be deter-
mined by the marginal cost of biodiesel, the impact of the high cost of
biodiesel on consumer goods transportation costs, and, ultimately,
consumer prices. Indeed, because biodiesel is such an expensive way
to reduce GHG emissions, it has been estimated that the RFS imposes
welfare costs of more than $300 per metric ton of CO2 reduction.110
Even using the Obama Administration estimates (which assume an
unrealistically low ability of economies to adapt to climate change),
this is about ten times the benefit of such reduction (social cost of
carbon avoided). Overall, given that corn ethanol emits only a little
less CO2 than petroleum-based gasoline, whatever environmental
benefit is achieved by the RFS is likely small relative to the welfare
loss from distorting consumption of food and fuel.111
The RFS is thus difficult to justify as an instrument for reducing
U.S. GHG emissions. Of course, this was not the only goal of the 2007
109. Harry de Gorter & David R. Just, The Social Costs and Benefits of Biofuels:
The Intersection of Environmental, Energy and Agricultural Policy, 32 APPL. ECON.
PERSP. & POL’Y 4, 6 (2010).
110. Meiselman, supra note 106, at 1.
111. Id. at 3–4.
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EISA: that law also was intended to increase farm income, increase
U.S. domestic energy production, and promote energy security. U.S.
domestic energy production and energy security have reached un-
precedently high levels. But this has everything to do with the adop-
tion of hydraulic-fracturing technology (“fracking”) and nothing to do
with the EISA. Beginning in late 2008, U.S. shale oil recovered via
fracking has doubled U.S. crude oil production over the last 15 years,
with the share of shale oil in total U.S. production rising from about
6% in January 2000 to almost 50% at the end of 2014.112 While relia-
bly predicting the future path of oil prices is impossible,113 there is
solid evidence that the U.S. fracking boom has lowered world oil
prices.114 As for energy security, in November 2017, the U.S. was sec-
ond only to Russia in total crude oil production, and U.S. oil imports
had fallen from roughly 66% of U.S. consumption in 2007 to 38% by
November 2017.115 The U.S. still imports oil, but due to the shale oil
fracking boom, the U.S. economy is much less sensitive to the global
oil price shocks that have often led to recessions.116
The only goal of the RFS in the 2007 EISA that seems to have been
realized is to massively increase corn prices and the amount of U.S.
agricultural land planted with corn. Many farmers and landowners in
the corn belt have benefited from such high prices.117 However, given
the significant costs imposed by the EISA and its relative ineffective-
ness in achieving any of its other goals, it may seem surprising that
Congress has repeatedly failed to pass legislation eliminating or modi-
fying the corn ethanol subsidy. U.S. Senators have been pressured to
drop the ethanol mandate by poultry producers facing higher feed
prices118 and by small oil refineries confronted by dramatic increases
112. Manuel Frondel et al., The U. S. Fracking Boom: Impacts on Global Oil Prices
and OPEC, IAEE ENERGY F. 33 (2018), https://www.iaee.org/en/publications/newslet
terdl.aspx?id=466 [https://perma.cc/V5LT-GMR8].
113. Christiane Baumeister & Lutz Kilian, Forty Years of Oil Price Fluctuations:
Why the Price of Oil May Still Surprise Us, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 139, 140 (2016).
114. Frondel et al., supra note 112.
115. Ryan Kellogg, U.S. Shale Boom Has Led to Big Payoffs, But Energy Indepen-
dence Isn’t One – Nor Should it Be, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2018, 10:33 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/ucenergy/2018/03/05/the-u-s-shale-oil-boom-has-led-to-big-pay
offs-but-energy-independence-isnt-one-nor-should-it-be/#734d8360d61b [https://per
ma.cc/JXM7-7SLF].
116. Id.
117. See Coral Davenport, Ethanol Mandate, a Boon to Iowa Alone, Faces Rising
Resistance, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/01/us/politics
/ethanol-mandate-a-boon-to-iowa-alone-faces-rising-resistance.html [https://perma.cc/
G978-UEP3] (stating that in the heart of ethanol country, Iowa, the ethanol mandate
has benefited not just farmers and landowners but also created new jobs for workers
at the 40 ethanol refineries located in the state who refine Iowa-grown corn into
ethanol).
118. See Clare Foran, Senators Could Dethrone King Corn in Ethanol Standards,
NAT’L J. (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/12/sena
tors-could-dethrone-king-corn-in-ethanol-standards/444300/ [https://perma.cc/RUQ2-
YZQS].
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in the price of RFS RINs.119 However, legislation modifying or repeal-
ing the RFS mandate has repeatedly failed to pass.120
Assuming that the RFS mandate’s costs do indeed far exceed its
benefits, in a world with zero legislative transaction costs, congres-
sional failure to modify or eliminate the ethanol mandate would be
puzzling.121 However, as discussed in Part II, the political economics
of repealing legislative carrots are much more complicated than this.
Once provisions cutting petroleum-industry subsidies were eliminated,
the toughened 2007 RFS received overwhelming support in both
chambers.122 It thus exemplified what has been called a universalistic
legislation bargain, one providing legislative carrots to a wide variety
of members and their districts/states.123 Such universalistic legislative
pork may be thought as a bill that combines carrots in a single deal,
carrots that legislators might otherwise have bargained for in a se-
quential log-roll. One can easily imagine a non-corn belt federal legis-
lator worrying that if she voted in favor of eliminating the key element
in that deal—the RFS—then corn belt representatives could turn
against provisions in other bills that brought concentrated benefits to
her own constituents.
In the case of ethanol, the complex institutional structure of Con-
gress makes the persistence of inefficient legislation even more likely.
The Senate system of representation—where each state gets two Sen-
ators, no matter its population or GDP—is probably enough to insure
economically-inefficient legislative outcomes. When combined with a
committee system that gives gatekeeping power to self- and party-
leader-selected committees, the obstacles to efficient legislative bar-
gaining are high.
This is especially true in the case of ethanol. As generally known,
Iowa leads the nation in ethanol production. According to the Iowa
Farm Bureau, 47% (1.3 billion bushels) of the corn grown in the state
goes to ethanol production, and Iowa alone produces nearly 30% of
119. See The Consumer and Fuel Retailer Choice Act: Hearing on S. 517 Before the
U.S. Senate Env’t & Pub. Works Comm. (2017) (statement of Tom Carper, Delaware
Senator).
120. Failures include S. 577, The Corn Ethanol Mandate Elimination Act of 2015,
and H.R. 704, The RFS Reform Act of 2015. Both of these acts died after referral to
committee (respectively, Senate EPW and House Subcommittee on Energy and
Power).
121. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1960).
122. The original house bill, H.R. 6 in the 110th Congress, would have cut petro-
leum industry subsidies. It passed both chambers, but the majority of Republicans
voting in the Senate, 23 out ouf 43, voted against the bill. The bill was amended to
retain petroleum industry subsidies, and in this form, it passed with a small minority
of only 7 Republican senators and one Democrat voting against it. See H.R. 6 (110th):
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/110/hr6 (last visited Oct. 9, 2018) [https://perma.cc/DD2N-68TC].
123. See generally Emerson M.S. Niou & Peter C. Ordeshook, Universalism in Con-
gress, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 246 (1985).
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America’s ethanol.124 Additionally, “[i]n 2015, the ethanol industry
was touted as supporting 39,592 jobs in Iowa—accounting for $4.2 bil-
lion of Iowa’s GDP and $2 billion of income for Iowa households.”125
Nebraska is the second largest ethanol-producing state (over two bil-
lion gallons of corn ethanol from 25 operating plants) and the third
largest corn producer, with 23,000 corn farmers planting almost nine
million acres with corn.126 In Illinois (as of 2012), 14 ethanol plants in
the state produced 1.7 billion gallons of ethanol, using 670 million
bushels of Illinois corn, employing nearly 4,000 workers, and adding
about $5.3 billion to the state’s economy.127 Due to the expansion in
corn acreage it induced, the ethanol mandate has increased the num-
ber of states with strong corn-ethanol interests. In Minnesota, one
producer group stated that in 2017, Minnesota produced 1.2 billion
gallons of ethanol, 3.9 million tons of dried distillers’ grains with
solubles (“DDGS”), and 256 million pounds of corn oil. The group
claims that in aggregate, ethanol generated $7.13 billion in gross sales
for Minnesota businesses and supporting 18,813 jobs.128 In South Da-
kota, economists have estimated that the state’s ethanol industry grew
“more than 441% in sales of ethanol and dried distillers grains since
2004.”129 Sales of ethanol and grain by-products were estimated to
have exceeded $2.983 billion, generating indirect business tax revenue
in 2012 over $18.5 million, and contributing “about $200 million in
direct value added to the state economy.”130 Even in arid Kansas, the
state corn growers’ association stated that as of 2018, 12 ethanol plants
produced nearly half a billion gallons of ethanol.131
The corn-ethanol industry is thus significant not just in Iowa, but in
at least another half-dozen states. The ethanol mandate thus exempli-
fies a public program that generates economic benefits to an interest
124. Ethanol Continues to Deliver for Iowa’s Economy, IOWA FARM BUREAU
(Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.iowafarmbureau.com/Article/Ethanol-continues-to-deliv
er-for-Iowas-economy [https://perma.cc/P6F5-BZ9W].
125. Id.
126. Nebraska Agriculture, NEB. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.nda.nebraska.gov/publi
cations/ne_ag_facts_brochure.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/8VCB-
FLG9].
127. Cathy Lockman, Illinois Ranks Among Top States for Ethanol Production,
FARM FLAVOR (July 19, 2012), https://www.farmflavor.com/illinois/illinois-ag-prod
ucts/illinois-ethanol-production/ [https://perma.cc/6Z54-GCUX].
128. Minn. Bio-Fuels Ass’n, Ethanol Industry Contributes $2.17 billion to Minne-
sota’s Economy, ETHANOL PRODUCER MAG. (Feb. 26, 2018), http://ethanolproducer.
com/articles/15075/ethanol-industry-contributes-2-17-billion-to-minnesotaundefineds-
economy [https://perma.cc/4S5S-LMSP].
129. S.D. Ethanol Producers Ass’n, SD Ethanol Industry has $3.8 Billion Impact on
2012 Economy, ETHANOL PRODUCER MAG. (July 16, 2013), http://ethanolproducer.
com/articles/10058/sd-ethanol-industry-has-3-8-billion-impact-on-2012-economy [htt
ps://perma.cc/28MZ-FUZ9].
130. Id.
131. Building Markets for Ethanol, KAN. CORN, https://kscorn.com/ethanol/ (last
visited Aug. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/P64L-J3PP].
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL107.txt unknown Seq: 31  6-DEC-18 14:47
2018] SOME POLITICAL ECONOMIC OBSERVATIONS 137
group—corn growers and ethanol producers—that is both homogene-
ous and geographically concentrated in a politically important way.
On the classic model of how congressional committees operate to dis-
tribute the benefits and burdens of pork-barrel projects, one would
expect it to be very difficult for Congress to eliminate the ethanol
mandate.132 This has proven to be true, and it is likely true for any
legislative climate change carrot that actually creates concrete benefits
for relatively homogeneous industries or groups.
V. OVER THE CLIFF: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN GLOBAL
COMPETITION TO SUBSIDIZE AND MANDATE SOLAR POWER
This Part of the article analyzes global competition in the produc-
tion of solar PV. The story of international competition in the produc-
tion of solar PV panels suggests a potential end result of the global
race among governments to subsidize and mandate the production of
renewable energy products for a global market created primarily by
these governments’ own regulatory requirements for the purchase and
use of such products (or services). That end result is that rather than
sharing in the profits from national subsidies, a small number of na-
tions—sometimes only one—capture all the profits, with all other na-
tions bearing the costs.
A. Germany, China and the Solar PV Panel Market
Rooftop solar panels are assembled from PV cells that convert solar
energy into electricity. Perhaps the most commonly found such cells
are made from crystalline silicon. The process by which such cells are
made begins with polysilicon, from which ingots are grown.133 The in-
gots are sliced into wafers, which are then processed to create cells
that convert solar energy into electricity.134 The cells are strung to-
gether to create PV modules that are then incorporated into the
panels.135
Under a program begun in 2000, Germany subsidized solar and
wind-power generation with its feed-in-tariff (“FIT”).136 Germany’s
FIT guaranteed a price far above market price to providers of solar-
and wind-generated electric power. The FIT resulted, unsurprisingly,
in a massive increase in solar- and wind-generated electric power in
132. Barry R. Weingast et al., The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neo-
classical Approach to Distributive Politics, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642, 642–43 (1981).
133. Stefan Reichelstein & Anshuman Sahoo, Cost and Price Dynamics of Solar
PV Modules 13 (Nov. 2015), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2015/06/Reichelstein-Sahoo-CostandPriceRevision-Nov2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N38M-24GK].
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Jeffrey Ball, Germany’s High-Priced Energy Revolution, FORTUNE (Mar. 14,
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/14/germany-renewable-clean-energy-solar/ [https://
perma.cc/WN8X-UTC4].
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL107.txt unknown Seq: 32  6-DEC-18 14:47
138 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
Germany. In 2010, a full 44% of all solar panels installed worldwide
were installed in Germany, and by 2015 Germany had become the
world’s largest solar market.137 Additionally, wind and solar provided
about one-third of the electricity consumed in Germany.138 But this
increase in renewable electricity—enshrined as national policy by the
so-called Energiewende of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG
2012)—has been costly. German households spent $26 billion on re-
newable electricity surcharges in 2016, and increases in the renewables
surcharge are the primary reason that the average German household
spent twice as much on electricity in 2016 than they did in 2007.139
The German government has consistently portrayed the
Energiewende as part environmental and part industrial policy. As an
industrial policy—a deliberate government intervention to direct in-
vestment and economic growth to certain sectors of the economy—
various German government ministries plus the Chancellor Angela
Merkel have portrayed the Energiewende as helping German compa-
nies innovate to become global market leaders in supplying renewable
technologies, thereby increasing employment in renewable energy in-
dustries.140 Germany is an export-driven economy, but the German
advantage globally is not in low labor or other input costs, and corre-
spondingly low prices, but in making and exporting highly-engineered
machines used to produce machines and goods abroad.141 German
policymakers never expected that their own aggressive pursuit of solar
energy would make German companies world leaders in the solar PV
module production process. Instead, they anticipated that by giving
German firms a head start, those firms would become world leaders in
the production and sale of the machines used in the solar PV panel-
production process, such as the very high precision cutting tools used
to slice ingots into wafers.142
Whatever success the Germans have enjoyed in achieving this goal
is likely to be temporary. China has quickly become a major world
supplier of solar PV cells, and it has the clear goal of becoming a
leader in the production of the machines used to produce solar PV
cells. As Huang et al., observed, China has a renewable energy pol-
137. Id.
138. Richard Martin, Germany Runs Up Against the Limits of Renewables, MIT
TECH. REV. (May 24, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601514/germany-
runs-up-against-the-limits-of-renewables/ [https://perma.cc/69JG-UVDS].
139. Ball, supra note 136.
140. Wilfried Lu¨tkenhorst & Anna Pegels, GERMANY’S GREEN INDUSTRIAL POL-
ICY, STABLE POLICIES – TURBULENT MARKETS: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PRO-
MOTING SOLAR PV AND WIND ENERGY, INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 8 (2014).
141. John Ydstie, Germany’s Export Machine Draws Both Envy and Ire, NPR (Jan.
5, 2018, 4:46 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/05/575615220/germanys-export-ma
chine-draws-both-envy-and-ire [https://perma.cc/UAF9-YWSL].
142. Lu¨tkenhorst & Pegels, supra note 140, at 45, 47.
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icy.143 It includes many features familiar to American and European
policymakers, such as laws requiring power-grid companies to provide
grid-connection services and to dispatch the entire amount of electric-
ity generated by renewable energy generators, and others which re-
quire generating companies to get specified shares of their power
from renewables.144
But China also has a renewable energy industrial policy. This policy
includes direct funding for research into large scale wind turbines, and
other wind power machines and equipment, and, through thirty-eight
national energy R&D centers, a number of PV R&D projects.145
More specifically, “in response to the central government’s call for
supporting strategic emerging industries, China’s state-owned banks
have given a huge amount of capital support to domestic PV manufac-
turers.”146 Of the $41.8 billion USD invested in the global solar indus-
try in 2010, $33.7 billion came from the Chinese government.147 The
China Development Bank (“CDB”) was the prime source of this capi-
tal infusion. Even after the worldwide economic recession of
2007–2009, the production of solar cells and modules in China contin-
ued “to acquire support from both central and local government.148 In
2009, the CDB . . . provided a line of credit of approximately $30
billion for Chinese solar cell and module manufacturers. . . .”149
“When the Chinese PV sector “lost its legitimacy” due to the imposi-
tion of anti-dumping duties by the European Commission in 2012, the
“Chinese central government strengthened its support for Chinese PV
by drafting three nationwide, dedicated documents” that “covered al-
most all aspects of PV, including PV manufacturing, PV generation
and PV technology.”150 And the new objectives became “quite spe-
cific and ambitious. For example, until [sic] leading polycrystalline
silicon manufacturers were to reach a production volume of five tons,
leading solar cell manufacturers were to reach a production volume of
five GW, and three to four PV machinery manufacturers were to earn
annual sales revenue of more than 1 billion CNY (about $0.2 billion
USD).”151
143. Ping Huang et al., How China Became a Leader in Solar PV: An Innovation
System Analysis, 64 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 777, 778 (2016).
144. Id.
145. Sufang Zhang et al., Interactions Between Renewable Energy Policy and Re-
newable Energy Industrial Policy: A Critical Analysis of China’s Policy Approach to
Renewable Energies, 62 ENERGY POL’Y 342, 345 (2013) [hereinafter Zhang et al.,
China’s Policy Approach to Renewable Energies].
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Huang et al., supra note 143, at 785.
149. Id. at 786.
150. Zhang et al., China’s Policy Approach to Renewable Energies, supra note 145,
at 347.
151. Id. at 786.
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Government subsidies and natural cost advantages have made
China the world leader in solar PV cell production. As Zhang et al.
stated:
China’s share of the world market in terms of solar PV production
has grown from about 1% in 2001 to more than 50% in 2010. In
2011, China manufactured 21 GW of solar cells, representing 60%
of the global market. . . . Out of the top 15 solar PV module manu-
facturers in the world, 9 were Chinese companies which took a
share of 30% . . . . Except for automatic printing machines and cut-
ting equipment, the industry is basically able to manufacture special
equipment for crystalline silicon solar cells domestically, and home-
grown enterprises are now capable of producing silicon-based thin-
film cells . . . .152
There appears to be some dispute as to whether China has acquired
the technological capability necessary to make the machines that are
used in the solar PV cell production process. “In 2009, the 48th Re-
search Institute of China Electronic Technology Group Corporation
built twenty c-Si solar cell production lines for Chinese solar PV cell
manufacturers, which largely consisted of self-developed PV machin-
ery . . . .”153 According to Huang et al., by this time, “it also became
clear that Chinese manufacturers of PV machinery were on the way to
becoming serious competitors for foreign machinery manufacturers in
the field of the c-Si solar cell machinery in which China special-
ized. . . . This increased competence resulted in a situation in which
about 70% of new manufacturing machines used in Chinese PV c-Si
solar cell manufacturing were now being made by Chinese manufac-
turers.”154 However, Zhang et al. opine to the contrary that “[f]or so-
lar PV technology, although crystalline silicon solar cell technology
has reached the international advanced level, the key production tech-
nology is lagging behind the international advanced level.”155
Still, while some Chinese commentators may be dismayed that pro-
gress has not been faster, there seems little doubt that China will
eventually become the world leader in the production not just of solar
PV cells and panels, but in the production of the machines used to
make these products. Such trends cast doubt on Germany’s ability to
use renewable energy policy as a catalyst for the acquisition of new
export markets.
Still, what China has done so far in the solar industry has made
them the world leader in solar PV production and devastated the U.S.
solar PV industry. Over the past several years, some U.S. solar panel
152. Zhang et al., China’s Policy Approach to Renewable Energies, supra note 145,
at 347.
153. Huang et al., supra note 143, at 785.
154. Id.
155. M.M. Zhang et al., Optimal Design of Subsidy to Stimulate Renewable Energy
Investments: The Case of China, 71 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 873,
875 (2017).
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makers (including SunEdison) have gone bankrupt, while others,
(such as First Solar) teeter still on the edge of bankruptcy.156 With its
own version of a FIT for solar power, by 2016, China not only made
over 50% of the solar PV panels worldwide, but also accounted for
more than 50% of global solar PV panel installations.157
B. The Potentially Dismal Economics of the Global Race to
Subsidize Renewable Energy Products and Services
German and Chinese renewable energy industrial policies can be
found in many other industrial countries, including of course the
United States. Such industrial policies constitute an economic phe-
nomenon which so far as I am aware, has been little studied: interna-
tional competition in subsidizing industries whose products are
intended to lessen or prevent a global public bad. Such industries tend
to be capital intensive, with diminishing average and marginal cost.
Moreover, because such an industry’s output is valuable primarily be-
cause it lessens a public bad, the demand for the industries’ output is
determined politically. Under politically-driven demand, price does
not have its traditional economic role, with a lower price increasing
the amount demanded. Instead, lower prices may actually shift the
demand curve back, contracting demand. Moreover, even if this effect
does not occur, if there are strong economies of scale, then the vast
majority of national subsidies may be pointless, as a single country—
like China—may end up dominating the market.
To analyze this phenomenon, consider a particular worldwide in-
dustry for solar PV cells and modules. As for the economics of the
solar PV industry, capital expenditure—the upfront cost to build a
factory and fill it with production equipment—has a crucial influence
on both long-run average total cost pricing and on manufacturing ca-
pacity growth rates. The existing literature shows that PV module pro-
duction is highly capital intensive and that because of this capital
intensity, sustained industry growth can only occur with very low op-
erating profit margins.158 Alternatively, only with technical or finan-
cial innovations massively reducing the annual capital expenditure (on
property, plant, and equipment) can the industry sustain rapid growth
and substantial operating profit margins.159 With significant econo-
mies of scale, there is constant pressure on PV makers to increase
156. John Fialka, Why China is Dominating the Solar Industry, SCI. AM. (Dec. 19,
2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-china-is-dominating-the-solar-
industry/ [https://perma.cc/MLN7-WVF2].
157. Renewables 2017, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.iea.org/
publications/renewables2017/ [https://perma.cc/99JH-NVHE].
158. Reichelstein & Anshuman, supra note 133, at 32–33.
159. Douglas M. Powell et al., The Capital Intensity of Photovoltaics Manufacturing:
Barrier to Scale and Opportunity for Innovation, 8 ENERGY ENVTL. SCI. 3395, 3400
(2015).
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capacity.160 In the case of many private, for-profit companies, the
competitive pressure for constant capacity increases can be met only
by borrowing. Taking on such large amounts of debt, however, in-
creases fixed cost even further, not only reducing the possibility to
internally fund growth in the future, but exposing a company to unan-
ticipated demand shortfalls. This seems to be precisely what accounts
for the bankruptcy of Suntech, a company that was once the largest
solar PV maker in the world.161
It is true that in the long run, due to technological progress and
learning, capacity becomes more productive and more effective in
lowering short term operating costs. When they looked at cost data for
ten large solar PV makers, Reichelstein and Sahoo did find evidence
that such learning effects should cause a steady decrease in the prices
of solar PV modules.162 However, they also found that the big drop in
average sales prices for solar PV modules over the period 2011–2013
was due to excessive additions to manufacturing capacity. Moreover,
Reichelstein and Sahoo estimated that in the long run, even though
there would be a 27% reduction in production costs with every doub-
ling of industry output, estimated average market prices would be be-
low the economically sustainable price (wages plus fixed plus tax
costs) for all industry production levels above 40 GW.163
Figure 6 below captures these stylized facts about the supply or pro-
duction side of the solar PV cell industry. The Figure depicts a situa-
tion where the firm has such high fixed capacity costs that long run
average cost continuously declines.
160. Alan C. Goodrich et al., Assessing the Drivers of Regional Trends in Solar
Photovoltaic Manufacturing, 6 ENERGY & ENVTL. SCI. 2811, 2811 (2013).
161. Powell et al., supra note 159, at 3401.
162. Reichelstein & Sahoo, supra note 133, at 6.
163. Id. at 30–31 (noting that even at an industry output of 60 GW, the U.S. Energy
Department’s market price goal of $0.05/W for PV modules would fall far short of the
roughly $2/W price that the industry would need to cover long run marginal cost at
that level of output).
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FIGURE 6
Natural Monopoly (and Alternatives) in a High
Fixed Cost Industry
Figure 6 is labeled “natural monopoly,” but this is only because
given the demand curve drawn, the point where demand equals long
run marginal cost—the socially optimal production level implied by
free-entry competition—implies a price at which the firm would lose
money.164 This is because the high fixed cost and low marginal cost
nature of production means that given the demand, average cost is
above marginal cost at the socially optimal level of production. Under
these conditions, competition, which forces price equal to marginal
cost, is not viable. Firms would either have to be subsidized, or else
monopoly would replace competition. The unregulated monopolist
would price discriminate, attempting to charge the full willingness to
pay that the demand curve depicts. Were the monopolist regulated to
prevent price discrimination, the regulator would typically allow the
monopolist to charge a price equal to average cost (as depicted in Fig-
ure 6).
164. Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV.
548, 548 (1969) (“If the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at
lowest cost by one firm rather than by two or more, [in this case] the market is a
natural monopoly, whatever the actual number of firms in it. If such a market con-
tains more than one firm, either the firms will quickly shake down to one through
mergers or failures, or production will continue to consume more resources than nec-
essary. In the first case competition is short-lived and in the second it produces ineffi-
cient results.”).
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Whether natural monopoly conditions pertain depends upon de-
mand. If the demand curve is steadily shifted outward in Figure 6, it
would eventually reach a situation where the competitive outcome of
price equals marginal cost occurs where marginal cost is above aver-
age cost (and both are increasing). For sufficiently robust demand,
competition is viable even in an industry with very high capacity costs.
In other words, even with very high capacity-driven fixed costs, a mo-
nopoly is only “natural” if demand is insufficiently great.
Figure 6 helps to explain the curious logic of national subsidies for
high capacity cost industries that compete in providing goods to lessen
global bads. The more nations mandate or subsidize the adoption of
renewable electricity, electric cars, and the like, the greater the global
demand for such goods. Even though many such industries have high
capacity costs and strong economies of scale, global demand means
that competition may well be viable. In such an instance, national sub-
sidies for the industries that produce renewable energy products may
not be needed, at least in the long run. This is to say that global re-
newable energy environmental policy may do away with the need for
global renewable energy industrial policy.
Under such economic conditions—where the production of renewa-
ble energy goods has strong economies of scale—there would likely
be only a few countries with renewable energy goods production, but
many countries with costly renewable energy mandates and subsidies.
That is, for the majority of countries, renewable energy environmental
policy would have failed to deliver the jobs and local profits promised
as part of renewable energy industrial policy. Most countries would
get none of the economic benefits of generating demand for the public
good by mandating or subsidizing consumption of renewable energy
products. Instead, they would bear only the cost of creating national
demand.
Yet the development of worldwide competition in the provision of
renewable energy goods is by no means a certainty. Taking solar PV
cells as an example, according to Reichelstein and Sahoo, the econom-
ically sustainable price—one that covers fixed and variable cost plus
taxes—remains below the average sales price in equilibrium until al-
most 200 GW of output.165 As 120 GW is a very optimistic forecast of
global demand for solar PV in the year 2022, the feasibility of compe-
tition in the solar PV market seems doubtful.166 For global renewable
energy markets for which competition is infeasible, virtually all coun-
tries would be in the position of subsidizing demand for monopolisti-
165. Reichelstein & Sahoo, supra note 133, at 30.
166. See Forecast of Demand for Solar Photovoltaic Power Globally from 2007 to
2022 (in Gigawatts), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/500250/solar-photo-
voltaic-demand-outlook-worldwide/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
3X57-BYPF] (forecasting optimistically because it is based on stated Chinese demand
goals and figures which may be little relationship to actual Chinese demand).
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cally or near monopolistically-produced goods manufactured abroad.
As a matter of political economy, this seems unlikely to be sustainable
as a political-economic equilibrium.
The bright side of economies of scale and learning in renewable en-
ergy product markets is that the price will fall over time. With a typi-
cal economic good, falling price means increasing demand. However,
matters are more complicated with goods whose demand is primarily
due to government mandates and subsidies. On the one hand, envi-
ronmentalists argue that falling prices for renewable energy justify
even more ambitious consumption mandates and subsidies. For exam-
ple, observing that “solar panels have become much more efficient
and less expensive” so that solar power is “now often the same price
or cheaper than most other types of electricity,” some have argued
that California should be even more aggressive in its renewable elec-
tricity mandate.167 On the other hand, once the cost of renewable en-
ergy falls so far that it becomes competitive with other types of
energy, the need for further subsidies becomes unclear at best. The
decrease in renewable electricity production costs has indeed been an
important argument for the reduction and eventual elimination of
Germany’s subsidies.
Thus, to the extent that economies of scale are realized so that we
have falling long run average cost for renewables, there are two po-
tential effects on demand. On the one hand, falling prices due to fall-
ing costs make more aggressive demand policies less costly; on the
other hand, falling costs means that there may be less need for public
policies to create demand in the first place. In the first case, where
falling prices actually shift the government-generated demand curves
outward, competition may become feasible where it would not other-
wise have been sustainable. In the second case, where falling costs
cause governments to weaken subsidies and mandates, shifting de-
mand curves inward, renewable energy markets may move back to-
ward natural monopoly.
Were a national government to design policies for the future of its
domestic renewable energy industry, it would thus need to account
for: i) uncertainty of how government-generated demand curves will
respond to the realization of economies in the production of renewa-
ble energy products, and ii) the very real possibility that it may be left
entirely in the position of subsidizing consumption of renewable en-
ergy produced by products manufactured in other countries. In other
industries with strong economies of scale and capacity-driven declin-
ing long run average cost, the economically rational response to the
prospect of potential future competition is to install excess capacity to
167. Ivan Penn, California Invested Heavily in Solar Power. Now There’s So Much
That Other States are Sometimes Paid to Take It, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 2017), http://
www.latimes.com/projects/la-fi-electricity-solar/ [https://perma.cc/4R7E-E3HB].
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL107.txt unknown Seq: 40  6-DEC-18 14:47
146 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
deter future entry.168 It would seem only logical that facing the pros-
pect of potential future complete loss of markets to foreign competi-
tors whose success is in large part due to their own renewable energy
demand mandates and subsidies, governments would have an even
greater incentive to subsidize excess capacity in domestic renewable
energy markets so as to forestall such a dismal future.
From the perspective of my earlier explanation of the persistence of
legislative carrots, the existence of strong economies of scale plus sub-
sidized international competition in the markets with domestic subsi-
dization makes such persistence even more likely. When industries
benefiting from domestic legislative carrots face potentially devastat-
ing international competition, they have a whole new set of arguments
in favor of retaining the carrots. It may be argued that even if the
success of international competitors is due solely to economics—econ-
omies of scale and learning, allowing a heavily subsidized domestic
industry such as solar or ethanol to fall victim to international compe-
tition would mean that billions of taxpayer dollars have gone for
naught. This argument is even stronger when international competi-
tors have received their own domestic subsidies. When this is true, the
logical response is to protect subsidized domestic industry from subsi-
dized international competition.
Precisely such a story has played out in the solar PV market, where
in late 2017, the U.S. International Trade Commission found that sub-
sidized solar panel imports were causing serious injury to the U.S. so-
lar PV industry and, on this basis, recommended the imposition of
tariffs as high as 35%.169 Such tariffs, of course, go well beyond merely
maintaining carrots, for they indirectly tax domestic consumers of in-
ternational products. The willingness to impose such costs is further
evidence of the stubborn persistence of legislative carrots in the cli-
mate change arena.
168. See Jeremy Bulow et al., Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry, 95 ECON. J. 178,
178 (1985); see also MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING
AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 10 (1985).
169. See Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells (Whether or Not Partially or Fully
Assembled into Other Products), Inv. No. TA-201-75, USITC Pub. 4739 (Nov. 2017)
(Final).
